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Ludwig Wittgenstein (b.26 April 1889, d.29 April 1951) Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein was an Austrian-British philosopher taught by Bertrand Russell. He worked primarily in the philosophy of mathematics; the philosophy of the mind; and the philosophy of language |
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1984, Oxford University Press, pbk Sorry, sold out, but click image above to access a prebuilt search for this title on Amazon UK Alternative online retailers to try: Or click here to access our prebuilt search for this title on Alibris Or click here to access our prebuilt search for this title on Ebay Click here to access our prebuilt search for this title on Biblio |
About this book/synopsis: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was not only the most important philosopher of his time, arguably one of the greatest ever; he also had a personality of quite exceptional strength, integrity and intensity that both disturbed and inspired those with whom he came into contact, and continues to influence those with whom he came into contact, and continues to influence those who discover him at second hand. The life he lived, too, was in many ways quite out of the ordinary. This book is a collection of vivid personal memoirs of Wittgenstein by five people who knew him intimately and in different ways. No philosophical knowledge is needed to read them; their collective effect is extraordinarily powerful. The authors are Wittgenstein's sister Hermine; his Russian teacher Fania Pascal; F. R. Leavis, a fellow Cambridge don; and two of his pupils, John King and M. O'C. Drury. The editor, the philosopher Rush Rhees, was a pupil and friend of Wittgenstein and is one of his literary executors. Norman Malcolm, author of the classic Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (also in Oxford Paperbacks) provides the introduction for this edition Contents: |
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1963, Routledge & Kegan Paul, hbk Sorry, sold out, but click image above to access a prebuilt search for this title on Amazon UK Alternative online retailers to try: Or click here to access our prebuilt search for this title on Alibris Or click here to access our prebuilt search for this title on Ebay Click here to access our prebuilt search for this title on Biblio |
About this book/synopsis: Bertrand Russell (introduction) says: Mr. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, whether or not it proves to give the ultimate truth on the matters with which it deals, certainly deserves, by its breadth and scope and profundity, to be considered an important event in the philosophical world. Starting from the principles of Symbolism and the relations which are necessary between words and things in any language, it applies the result of this enquiry to various departments of traditional philosophy, showing in each case how traditional philosophy and traditional solutions arise out of ignorance of the principles of Symbolism and out of misuse of language. The logical structure of propositions and the nature of logical inference are first dealt with. From there to Theory of Knowledge, Principles of Physics, Ethics and finally the Mystical (das Mystische). In order to understand Mr. Wittgenstein's book, it is necessary to realize what is the problem with which he is concerned. In the part of his theory which deals with Symbolism, he is concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language. There are various problems as regards language. First, there is the problem of what actually occurs in our minds when we use language with the intention of meaning something by it; this problem belongs to psychology. Secondly, there is the problem as to what is the relation subsisting between thoughts, words, or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean; this problem belongs to epistemology. Thirdly, there is the problem of using sentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood; this belongs to the special sciences dealing with the subject-matter of the sentences in question. Fourthly, there is the question: what relation must one face (such as a sentence) have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that other? This last is a logical question and is the one with which Wittgenstein is concerned |
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