
1994, Routledge, hbk
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About this book/synopsis: This book presents recent developments in the economics of asymmetric information. The problems of selection & moral hazard, with hidden actions or hidden information are introduced by examining how they affect the market for investment finance. The ideas are then used to analyse the market for insurance, signalling & screening models of education, efficiency wages, industrial regulation, public procurement and auctions. The style is clear, and the coverage is thorough while avoiding excessive mathematical detail. Diagrams & verbal reasoning make the ideas accessible to intermediate-level undergraduate students & beyond
Contents: Preface
Introduction
The wisdom of Solomon
The organisation of topics
Part 1. Investment Finance & Asymmetric Information:
1. Asymmetric Information in the Market for Investment Finance
1.1 Overview
1.2 The selection Problem
1.3 The hidden action problem
1.4 The costly state verification problem
2. Investment Finance & the Selection Problem
2.1 Overview
2.2 The selection problem and the credit market
2.3 The selection problem and equity finance
2.4 Credit rationing
2.5 Discussion
2.6 Recommended Reading
2.7 Problems
3. Investment Finance & the Hidden Action Problem
3.1 Overview
3.2 Hidden action and the credit market
3.3 The hidden action problem and equity finance
3.4 Market collapse
3.5 Credit rationing
3.6 Problem
4. Investment Finance & the Costly State Verification Problem
4.1 Overview
4.2 Hidden information and the credit market
4.3 The credit market and business cycles
4.4 Recommended Reading
4.5 Problems
Part 2. Asymmetric Information Problems in the Insurance Market:
5. Insurance & Risk Aversion
5.1 Overview
5.2 Attitudes towards risk
5.3 Risk aversion and insurance
5.4 Recommended Reading
5.5 Problems
6. Insurance & The hidden action problem
6.1 Overview
6.2 Insurance and the hidden
action problem
6.3 Recommended reading
6.4 Problems
7. Insurance & The Selection Problem
7.1 Overview
7.2 Insurance and different risk categories under full information
7.3 Pooling together different risk categories
7.4 Separating contracts and equilibrium concepts
7.5 Recommended reading
7.6 Problem
Part 3. The Labour Market: Education, Signalling, Screening and Efficiency Wages
8. The Selection Problem and Education
8.1 Overview
8.2 Education and screening
8.3 Education and signalling
8.4 Discussion
8.5 Recommended reading
8.6 Problems
9. The Hidden Action Problem and Efficiency Wages
9.1 Overview
9.2 Reasons for paying efficiency wages
9.3 The hidden action problem and the shirking model
9.4 Recommended reading
9.5 Problems
Part 4. Regulation, Public Procurement and Auctions:
10. Regulation and Procurement
10.1 Overview
10.2 Regulation and hidden information
10.3 Procurement with hidden information and hidden action
10.4 Recommended reading
10.5 Problem
11. Auctions
11. 1 Overview
11.2 Auctions and information problems
11.3 Private value auctions and the revenue equivalence theorem
11.4 Optimal auctions
11.5 Common value auctions and the winner's curse
11.6 Recommended reading
11.7 Problems
Notes, bibliography, Index |
Other Books By Brian Hillier
Macroeconomics
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